We analyze a multiple-activity, principal-agent model in which the activities are naturally substitutable for the agent and complementary for the principal. A basic result is that the optimal compensation must cause the agent to view the activities as complements. This complementarity is achieved by employing a compensation scheme that is typically nonmonotone and makes success on multiple dimensions the sole source of large rewards. A number of empirical implications follow, along with explanations for some existing empirical findings. We also discuss applications to compensation in specific occupations.
I. Introduction
One of the most familiar ideas in economics is that specialization and division of labor allow more output from a given set of inputs. The way that complementarities among tasks ultimately limit specialization and determine how tasks are grouped into jobs has also been explored exWe thank the referee, George Baker, Alison Booth, Jim Brickley, Jeff Campbell, Ed Lazear, Andy Leone, Sherwin Rosen, Mike Ryall, Cliff Smith, Jerry Zimmerman, and especially Susan Athey for thoughtful comments. We also benefited from presenting this work at the 1998 Society of Labor Economists conference, the National Academy of Sciences Symposium on Devising Incentives to Promote Human Capital, the University of Virginia, and the University of Rochester. tensively.
1 However, little is known about how such complementarities influence the provision of incentives. In this paper we develop and analyze a simple model of agency that highlights the impact of complementarities across tasks on the optimal compensation for an agent who must allocate time across those tasks. In our model, the principal views time spent on the various tasks as complements and prefers that the agent allocate some time to each of the tasks. But because the tasks are competing uses of time, the agent views time spent on them as substitutes and so prefers to allocate time only to the less arduous tasks. If the principal knows the relative cost the agent attaches to the various tasks, the principal can offset the agent's inclination to specialize in less costly tasks by offering lower rewards for success in those tasks and higher rewards for success in tasks the agent finds more costly. But in the more plausible situation in which the principal is unsure about the agent's preferences over tasks, incentives rewarding success on any individual task can be highly suboptimal since they can induce agents who find those tasks less costly to specialize in them. This is the phenomenon we refer to as "adverse specialization."
To motivate the agent to spend time on numerous activities, the principal's optimal contract causes the agent to view the tasks as strongly (in a sense we make precise) complementary. Interestingly, it is useful to reward failure on all tasks to some degree since this reduces the risk the agent accepts by spreading his time across multiple activities. Of course, the reward for overall failure cannot be too large since this outcome is easy for the agent to attain. Likewise, to deter adverse specialization, the payment for success on any individual task also cannot be large. Thus the payments for no success and partial success cannot be large. It is interesting that in order to avoid creating incentives for adverse specialization, it is typically optimal to reward no success more than partial success. Finally, since success on multiple activities is difficult to achieve, to make it attractive for the agent to attempt to deliver general success, the payment for succeeding must be very large. Altogether, in an optimal contract, full success, and only full success, is rewarded highly.
Since we assume that success on each individual task is uncertain and dependent on the amount of time allocated to the task, the probability of success on all tasks is relatively small. Thus the agent receives the high payoff from full success with low probability and receives the much lower payoffs from no success or partial success with higher probability. So given an optimal contract, the distribution of potential compensation confronting the agent is right-skewed. This result is consistent with data on executive compensation in which stock options are a common part of executive compensation but the occurrence of large payoffs is relatively rare. 2 Our model provides some insights into the way stock options and bonuses are used in executive compensation. To the extent that stock options reward general success, our model suggests that their use is valuable in avoiding adverse specialization. It also suggests that bonuses for success on particular dimensions encourage adverse specialization in activities the executive finds interesting or in which it is easy to succeed. Thus it is interesting to note that although bonuses are commonly part of executive compensation, they are rarely tied to specific accomplishments, and instead typically reward some measure of general firm success. 3 The optimal contract obtained in our model contrasts with those obtained in much of the principal-agent literature. In the early work on agency (as surveyed, e.g., in MacDonald [1984] and Hart and Holmström [1987] ), optimal compensation is a nonlinear function of all variables that are observed by the principal and affect the agent's decision problem. But observed compensation is not as complicated as this literature suggests it should be. In fact, Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) assert that the simplicity of observed compensation contracts is an important fact contradicting the early agency models. On the other hand, Ferrall and Shearer (1999) estimate that the efficiency loss from simplistic incentives is as large as the loss from asymmetric information. Later work (e.g., Milgrom [1987, 1991] ; see also the survey by Prendergast [1999] ) shows that there are agency environments in which linear compensation contracts are optimal and that, in some settings, compensation is sensitive only to whether the agent participates. But there is ample evidence that compensation contracts, while less complicated than the early theory predicts, do contain a variety of incentives. 4 In our model, the optimal compensation contract is both simple, in the sense that it provides large rewards for few possible out-comes, and complex, in the sense that pay is a nonlinear, typically nonmonotone, function of the agent's success in multiple tasks.
The problem of an agent's allocation of effort across multiple tasks has been considered by, for example, Milgrom (1991, 1994) and Baker (1992) . These papers study task-specific piece rates and do not emphasize the tension created by tasks that are complements for the principal but substitutes for the agent. In an environment in which this tension is important, we show that a linear piece-rate contract is never optimal.
The paper is structured as follows. We conclude this section with several examples that fit the basic assumptions of the model. In these examples, agents view various activities as substitute uses of their time, the principal views the agent's time spent on multiple activities as complements, and it is difficult for the principal either to know the agent's preferences or to monitor the details of how the agent spends his time. In Section II, we set out the model. Then in Section III, we analyze the structure of optimal compensation and develop some empirical implications. In Section IV, we provide details on the above-mentioned executive compensation issues and offer some suggestions for future data collection based on the model. Section V discusses related research more thoroughly and explores the sensitivity of our results to details of the model. Proofs are in the Appendix.
A. Examples

Nuclear Power
Nuclear power plants provide a nice example of the environment described by the model. 5 The owner of a nuclear power plant, the principal, would like the plant employees, the agents, to maintain the main power generation process and multiple redundant systems backing it up. The principal would also like the agents to be alert and generally safety conscious. Failure of any system must be reported to regulatory authorities, and as a result, the system may be more actively monitored or even shut down by regulators, an outcome that is particularly bad for the principal. Thus the principal is interested in the overall operation and safety of the facility, and success is defined by a very low failure rate on all systems over an extended period. Agents can spend time monitoring, testing, and maintaining the various systems, as well as observing the facility and other workers and taking actions to enhance general safety. For the agent, effort on a main system component, effort on its backup, and effort devoted to general safety are substitute uses of time.
It is very difficult to determine what individual employees are doing at any point in time or how onerous they find the various tasks to which they are assigned, but it is easy to determine whether the various systems are functioning as intended.
The model predicts that employees will be compensated using, for example, a bonus that rewards only a high level of performance for all the systems they maintain. In the nuclear power generation industry, employees responsible for operation of the nuclear facility receive bonuses, commonly amounting to one-quarter of their annual salary, should they meet a system performance standard set by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The WANO index and standard for a given job aggregate multiple dimensions of system performance in a way that is frequently highly nonlinear, essentially rewarding only a high level of success. For employees in charge of fuel integrity, for example, loss of integrity for a single fuel "pin" (a typical reactor has about 20,000) leads to a reduction of about 8 percent in their WANO index, all but eliminating the prospect of meeting the standard needed to receive a bonus.
This example suggests a variety of others in which the key issue is reliability on multiple dimensions: computer networks, electricity grids, production of aircraft, air traffic control, and so forth. Our results suggest that, in all these cases, optimal compensation will reward overall success and punish any failure, including failure on multiple dimensions, in much the same way.
Product Management
Firms change their products over time by enhancing features, adding new capabilities, improving reliability or durability, incorporating new technology or materials, and so on. For the value of the firm to be as great as possible, this ongoing process must be managed carefully. The firm also makes decisions of a more short-run nature that are also important from the standpoint of value maximization, for example, pricing and advertising.
Complementarities among these activities are abundant. For example, product improvements are more valuable if the new product will be priced carefully and advertised in the appropriate media. Likewise, careful pricing of an outdated product is much less valuable than careful pricing of a state-of-the-art version. For these reasons, a product manager is typically responsible for both long-run and short-run decisions. But these activities are competing uses of the product manager's time. And it is generally difficult for senior management to determine how a product manager's efforts are split between consideration of short-run and long-run decisions or to know the nature of the managers' predilections and skills. Overall, this problem is one that falls naturally into the structure of our model. Here the model predicts that product managers will receive the greatest rewards for the full success of their products, including an evaluation of both short-run profitability and the success of the introduction and phaseout of successive vintages of the product, but that there will be little specific compensation for these tasks.
NYSE Specialists
The New York Stock Exchange seeks to provide a "fair and open" securities market. Efforts to achieve this broad goal include monitoring price and volume variation to uncover insider trading or stock price manipulation, keeping an eye on member firms' compliance with financial or operational requirements, detecting violations of sales practices, and encouraging specialists to produce a "fair and orderly" market. All these features are complementary from the standpoint of the NYSE's providing profitable transactions services; for example, monitoring price and volume variation is useless if member firms engage in fraudulent sales practices or maintain inadequate working capital. Specialists, the agents of the NYSE, play an important role in maintaining market quality. Their functions include maintaining current bid and ask prices for their stocks, executing orders entrusted to them by trading floor brokers, and generally promoting stability, liquidity, and continuity in the market. From the perspective of the specialist, these activities are competing uses of time. Correspondingly, according to our results, specialists should be evaluated primarily on their overall success at maintaining fair and orderly markets rather than on the individual components of their performance.
II. Model
As in other models of agency, the players are a principal and an agent. The agent chooses how to allocate his time, and this allocation, together with a random shock, determines what the principal receives. The principal selects the structure of the agent's compensation beforehand and later makes the payment promised for the realized production.
The agent's job involves more than one task. Specifically, the agent divides his time among two activities and all other uses of time, with a total of one unit of time available. We model the principal's uncertainty about the agent's relative cost of performing different tasks by assuming that there are two types of agents who differ in their relative costs of performing the activities and that the principal believes the agent is equally likely to be of either type.
For each type, let t represent the amount of time devoted to the activity for which that type has comparatively low effort cost and t represent the amount of time devoted to the other activity, where t, and Effort costs are given by with The t ≥ 0 t ϩ t ≤ 1. yt ϩ t , y [0, 1). cost of all other uses of time is normalized to zero. We adopt this linear specification to emphasize the conflicting preferences of the principal and agent; that is, the agent sees time allocated to different activities as highly substitutable whereas, as detailed below, the principal regards them as complements.
The agent's time allocation is not observed by the principal, but the principal sees the outcomes of the agent's efforts. Assume that the outcome is either success or failure for each of the two activities, with the probability of success equal to the fraction of the day spent on the activity, and that outcomes are determined independently. The principal obtains positive output Q if and only if the agent has success on both activities, which we refer to as "full success." Thus the probability with which the principal obtains positive output is irrespective of the tt agent's type. This is the sense in which the agent's activities are complements from the principal's perspective. Observe that if the agent specializes in either activity, success on that activity is assured, but the principal has zero output.
The principal determines the agent's compensation. A contract is a vector where the agent is paid n (for "no" successes) if c { (n, p, f ), both activities fail, p (for "partial" success) if just one activity succeeds, and f (for "full" success) if both activities succeed. Again, only the last of these outcomes yields output for the principal. Let be the agent's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility funcu : ‫ޒ‬ r ‫ޒ‬ tion. Assume that u is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. Thus, given an arbitrary contract and effort alc p (n, p, f ) location by working for the principal the agent earns expected (t, t ), utility
where the agent achieves full success and utility with probability u( f ) achieves partial success and utility u(p) with probability tt , t(1 Ϫ t ) ϩ 6 For now, we assume that the principal does not try to induce types to self-select by offering a menu of contracts. We also assume that the payment for partial success does not depend on which activity is successful. In Sec. VB, we argue that the principal gains nothing by offering a menu of contracts and gains only from offering differential payments for partial success in special cases, such as when the principal can observe the agent's type. We also temporarily ignore the fact that an optimal contract may discourage adverse specialization by requiring a payment from agent to principal when partial success occurs; i.e., it may be that Of course, limited liability or wealth constraints could render p ! 0. such contracts infeasible. As we also explain in Sec. VB, requiring a lower bound such as alters the results only minimally and in the expected way. p ≥ 0 achieves no success and utility u(n) with probability (1 Ϫ t)t ,
( 1 Ϫ and incurs effort cost yt from time spent on the low-cost activity t)(1 Ϫ t ), and from time spent on the high-cost activity. We assume that the t agent has a known outside alternative yielding expected utility Obu. serve that we place no restrictions onū.
The principal is risk neutral and has expected utility
where the principal receives Q and pays f to the agent with probability pays p to the agent with probability and pays n tt , t(1 Ϫ t ) ϩ (1 Ϫ t)t , to the agent with probability (1 Ϫ t)(1 Ϫ t ).
Given (1) and (2), the principal-agent problem can be stated as
subject to incentive compatibility,
and individual rationality,
The basic economic tensions in the model are obvious. Suppose that the principal chooses a contract whose payments do not depend on the outcome, that is, Then (1) becomes and (2)
In this case the agent prefers to do nothing and, if tt Q Ϫ n. forced to allocate a positive amount of time to work, prefers to perform only the low-cost activity. The principal, in contrast, prefers that the agent devote all his available time to work and divide his time equally between the two activities.
III. Results
To analyze the principal-agent problem, we first determine the time allocation the agent will choose given an arbitrary contract and then characterize the principal's choice of contract taking the agent's response into account.
A. Agent's Time Allocation
Given a contract c, the agent's problem (for either type) is max V(t, t , c) subject to t, t ≥ 0 and t ϩ t ≤ 1.
t,t
A useful preliminary result is that, given an arbitrary contract c, if the agent does not shirk or specialize, he divides all his available time between the two activities while devoting the majority of time, but not all, to his low-cost activity; we refer to this as "splitting" time.
Lemma 1. Given a contract c, if the agent participates, he chooses such that either (i) or (ii) and
1. An implication of lemma 1 is that even if the principal deters shirking and adverse specialization, she cannot achieve her most preferred division, since she cannot prevent the agent from devoting
the majority of the available time to his low-cost activity. To understand why this is the case, let
(When it causes no confusion, we drop the argument c.) Thus D f is the difference in utility the agent obtains from achieving full success versus partial success, and D p is the difference obtained from achieving partial success versus no success. Substituting
If we assume that the contract deters both shirking and adverse specialization, the first-order condition describing the agent's optimal time allocation (using is
and the second-order condition is Since these
The second term in (4) accounts for the f p D Ϫ D 1 0. fact that an increase in t substitutes low-cost time for high-cost time. To interpret the first term, note that when the agent splits his time, the probabilities of full success and complete failure are the same and are nonlinear in t; that is, Thus the way the tt p t(1 Ϫ t) p (1 Ϫ t )(1 Ϫ t). probability of full success or failure responds to a change in time devoted to the low-cost activity depends on how much time is already allocated to it, that is, whether Since the agent prefers to
, make full success or failure more likely at the expense of partial success. It follows that if then the agent always benefits by increasing t than specialize. As we show in proposition 1 below, in order to deter adverse specialization, the principal must induce sufficient complementarity between activities. In reference to (3), since
t and are strategic complements if and only if the utility increment t the agent receives by achieving full success instead of partial success, D f , exceeds the utility increment associated with partial success versus no success, D p . When t and are strategic complements, the agent's t increasing t causes increases in to be more attractive to him, and vice t versa. According to proposition 1, in order for there to be a positive probability of full success, and thus positive output, the principal's contract choice must do more than make the activities complementary for the agent. That is, is not enough. The contract must result
The greater the difference in relative costs of tasks,
the stronger the complementarities the principal must create to deter adverse specialization.
Proposition 1. Strong complementarities. Given a contract c, there is a positive probability of full success only if
The intuition behind proposition 1 is most transparent when the contract is monotone, that is, so and Assume
this, and suppose that the agent is considering specializing in his lowcost activity. If the agent marginally increases the time he devotes to the high-cost activity and marginally decreases the time he devotes to the low-cost activity, there are three effects, two harmful and one beneficial. First, the reallocation of time makes partial success less likely and complete failure more likely, which is costly for the agent since Second, the reallocation substitutes high-cost time for low-cost
time, causing a net loss of per unit of time reallocated. Third, the 1 Ϫ y reallocation of time makes full success more likely, at the expense of partial success, which is beneficial for the agent since Thus the
Or, for splitting the day to
Proposition 1 is a simple one, but it has important implications for the trade-offs the principal faces when selecting a contract. For example, increasing the pay for complete failure contributes to the complementarity between the activities (since it lowers D p ), whereas increasing pay for partial success makes the necessary complementarities harder to achieve (since it lowers D f and increases D p ). Thus having to create strong complementarities pushes the principal in the direction of low pay for partial success and greater pay for complete failure. This result relies on our assumption that the principal attaches no value to partial success, a requirement that the examples given earlier fit nicely. But more generally, this feature will appear whenever overall success is much more valuable than partial success, for example, in situations involving significant "system effects."
An implication of proposition 1 is that positive output is not even possible, let alone likely, if the pay for success on one activity does not depend on success on the other. Consider, for example, activity-specific piece rates. In that case, for some and In this r 1 0, p p n ϩ r fp p ϩ r. case, which is exactly the opposite of what is needed to create
Corollary 1. Suboptimality of piece rates. For if and r 1 0, p p n ϩ r then full success is never achieved and output is zero.
It is useful to solve for the agent's allocation of time when the agent splits his time. To do so, solve the first-order condition (4) for t to get where t p t(c),
Equation (5) illustrates the impact of the contract-induced complementarities and shows how differences in the agent's effort costs affect the time allocation. The greater the induced complementarities, as measured by the closer the agent's chosen time allocation to the f p D Ϫ D , principal's preferred allocation. Thus not only do sufficient complementarities make positive output possible, but greater complementarities induce a time allocation more favorable to the principal. Likewise, the more disparate the effort costs, as measured by the more 1 Ϫ y, disadvantageous the agent's time allocation is from the principal's perspective.
We have shown that the principal has positive expected payoff only if
The following result is useful in formulatt p 1 Ϫ t p t(c) (0, 1). ing the principal's problem and gives necessary and sufficient conditions for this time allocation to be optimal for the agent.
Lemma 2. Given contract c, it is optimal for the agent to choose satisfying if and only if (i)
When the first part of lemma 2 holds, the agent prefers t p 1 Ϫ to adverse specialization. The second part of lemma 2 implies t p t(c) that this time allocation is at least as good as shirking or not participating. 7 When the agent is indifferent between working and not working, we assume that the indifference is resolved in favor of working. Specifically, if for some V(t, t , c) p V(0, 0, c) then we assume that the agent does not choose time allocation (0, 0); (t, t ) ( (0, 0), and if for some then we assume that the agent participates.
B. Principal's Contract Choice
We assume that the model's exogenous parameters are such that it is in the principal's interest to induce the agent to work, which implies that there is a contract c satisfying the conditions of lemma 2, and such that Then the agency problem can be stated as
Let denote the contract chosen by the principal, and * * * * c p (n , p , f ) let and
The following preliminary results are useful for our analysis of the structure of an optimal contract. Our first result is that to deter shirking and adverse specialization, neither nor can be as large as * * * n p f . Lemma 3. In an optimal contract, and * * * * f 1 n f 1 p . The need to deter shirking gives the first part of lemma 3. The second part then follows from proposition 1, which says that * * f p D Ϫ D 1 1 Ϫ y must hold to create complementarities sufficient to deter adverse specialization.
Our second preliminary result is that the constraints that the agent participate and not shirk both bind, implying that is determined by * n the value of the agent's outside option.
Lemma 4. In an optimal contract, * * * *
According to lemma 4, the agent's individual rationality and no-shirking constraints must hold with equality. If individual rationality does not bind, then we show that the principal can lower n and p in such a way that the agent's time allocation does not change, thus increasing the principal's payoff. To see why the no-shirking constraint also binds, note that increasing n toward f increases complementarities and so affects the agent's time allocation in a way that increases the probability of full success. Thus the principal has an incentive to increase n toward f. But given the fact that the individual rationality constraint binds, the noshirking constraint requires that which gives a binding upper * ū (n ) ≤ u, bound on . * n Lemmas 3 and 4 do not answer the question whether or is larger. * * p n For the purpose of generating complementarities and reducing her expected payments to the agent, the principal would like to choose resulting in a nonmonotonic contract. Numerical examples with * * p ! n , plausible parameter values deliver exactly this case. For example, consider a firm with Q p $1 billion and a CEO with wealth w p $10 million and an outside option that pays $300,000. Suppose that the CEO is responsible for two tasks and has utility if he receives comu(x) Ϫ yt Ϫ t pensation x and devotes time t to his preferred activity and time to t the other activity; he is constrained to choose Assume that t ϩ t ≤ 1. and where so that the CEO's relative Ϫax y p .5 u(x) p Ϫ4e , a p 3/w risk aversion is 3, corresponding to levels of relative risk aversion suggested in Haubrich (1994) . Then the optimal contract is p $300,000, * n p $71,712, and p $9,979,774, resulting in a time allocation * * p f and Thus, in this example, the payment for partial t p .56 t p .44. success is well below the payment for no success, and the payment for full success is over 30 times the payment for no success.
Although one would expect nonmonotonicity to be the most common case, if is large, it can be optimal for the principal to increase p abovē u n and accept greater specialization by the agent in order to satisfy individual rationality. In the example given in the previous paragraph, the optimal contract has if the payment from the agent's outside * * p p n alternative is about $1.05 million, and the optimal contract has * p 1 if the payment from the outside alternative exceeds $1.05 million. 8 * n In general, while it is possible that we can show that the utility * * p 1 n , from can never be much greater than the utility from . * * p n Proposition 2. Low payment for partial success. In an optimal contract, * *
Proposition 2 follows directly from proposition 1 and lemma 4. From these results, if then the agent prefers adverse spe- * * u(p ) Ϫ y ≥ u(n ), cialization over splitting his time. It follows from proposition 2 that a nonmonotone contract is always optimal when giving us the y p 0, following corollary.
Corollary 2. If then * * y p 0, p ! n . We can also characterize when the principal chooses a monotonic contract in terms of the optimal degree of specialization. A monotonic contract is optimal only when it is also optimal for the principal to allow the agent to be highly (although not completely) specialized. In this case, partial success is by far the most likely outcome, and rewarding it more highly is necessary to attract the agent at all.
Proposition 3. Characterization of nonmonotonicity. In an optimal contract, * * * ͱ p n ⇔ t(c ) 1/(1 ϩ y). Proposition 3 says that the principal offers a nonmonotonic contract if it is optimal for the principal to induce the agent to split his time close to equally. Since a division of time that is close to equal is more valuable when Q is large, proposition 3 suggests that when Q is large, the complementarities and resulting time allocation induced by a non-8 For example, if the agent's outside alternative pays $3.25 million (the maximum such that the agent participates in equilibrium), is $3.25 million, is $4.59 million, and * * n p is $39.35 million. * f monotonic contract are particularly valuable, and so the principal will not select a monotonic contract. The next proposition shows that this intuition is correct as long as the agent values incremental income enough. Specifically, if Q is large and the agent's utility function is such that finite compensation can deliver sufficiently high utility, then the optimal contract is nonmonotone.
Proposition 4. Sufficient conditions for nonmonotonicity. In an optimal contract, if Q is large and there exist and
such that where
The condition on the utility function in proposition 4 is always satisfied if the utility function is unbounded, giving us the following corollary.
Corollary 3. If Q is large and u is unbounded, then * * p ! n . Propositions 2-4 show that the optimal contract is either nonmonotonic or close to nonmonotonic, and from proposition 3, we know that full success is always the most highly compensated outcome. In fact, we can show that, monotonic or not, optimal compensation has increasing differences, implying that is always large in comparison to and * * f n . * p Proposition 5. Increasing differences. In an optimal contract, if
which implies * * * * f Ϫ p 1 p Ϫ n . From proposition 5, we have the following corollary. Corollary 4. Convexity. In an optimal contract, compensation is a convex function of the number of successes.
Notice that in the nonmonotone case, which is most plausible, proposition 5 implies that is at least twice as large as plus a * * * * f Ϫ n n Ϫ p , (possibly large) constant. Not only is large, but it is also unlikely to * f be earned, which has implications for the distribution of pay facing the agent given an optimal contract. Full success and no success both occur with probability Partial success occurs with proba-
Given proposition 5, this pay distribution
is quite positively skewed in that it places the most weight (more than .75 in this simple model) on the two lower values of compensation and much less (less than .25) on the much higher value.
9 Thus, even though the agent is risk averse, increasing the variance of the pay distribution can be optimal if the skewness also increases, because skewness plays a key role in creating incentives for the agent.
While the distribution of compensation is skewed, the principal provides some insurance, so the distribution of pay is less skewed than the distribution of output. 10 The distribution of output has mass on zero equal to and mass on Q equal to
Proposition 6. Skewness. In an optimal contract, both the distribution of compensation and the distribution of output per dollar of compensation have medians that are strictly less than their expected values.
Proposition 6 is an important implication because skewness is a common property of virtually every empirical income distribution and is extreme within many occupations. Thus any theory of compensation must be consistent with it. 11 The skewness of pay in our model is driven by the principal's difficult task of causing the agent to prefer dividing time in a way that exploits complementarities among activities over shirking or adversely specializing in activities that are easy or enjoyable.
Our final result concerns the way optimal compensation responds to changes in the value that the principal receives when the agent achieves full success.
Proposition 7. In an optimal contract, an increase in Q causes an increase in a decrease in , and no change in . * * * f , p n As proposition 7 shows, when full success is more valuable to the principal, she responds by increasing incentives through an increase in the payment for full success and a decrease in the payment for partial success. Although increasing the payment for no success would also increase incentives, the constraint that the agent not shirk binds at the optimum, and so the principal cannot increase this payment. 9 In our numerical example, the expected compensation is $2.5 million, the median is $300,000, the standard deviation is $4.2 million, and the skewness (zero for a symmetric distribution) is 1.178. 10 In our numerical example, the distribution of output has expected value $246 million, median zero, standard deviation $431 million, and skewness 1.180. The distribution of output per dollar of compensation has mean $25, median zero, standard deviation $43, and skewness 1.180.
11 Models of superstars' compensation (see Rosen 1981 Rosen , 1983 ; MacDonald 1988) also generate a right-skewed pay distribution. However, the reason for the skewness is different. In superstar models, skewness arises because the relation between talent and compensation is convex; thus the distribution of pay is skewed relative to the distribution of talent. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that when compensation is restricted to either piece rates or tournaments, the implied distribution of pay can be right-skewed. This occurs because, while the tournament structure is riskier, it can generate superior incentives and thus can be optimal for individuals who are less averse. See Neal and Rosen (2000) for a survey of models of income distribution.
Recall that the extent of complementarities induced by the principal's choice of contract is given by and that the greater the complef p D Ϫ D mentarities, the more advantageous the agent's allocation of time is from the principal's perspective. Proposition 7 implies that the greater the payoff for full success, the more the principal uses the contract to induce greater complementarities.
Corollary 5. In an optimal contract, an increase in Q causes an increase in the degree of complementarities, and an increase * * f p D Ϫ D , in the probability of full success.
Corollary 5 gives the intuitive result that as the value of output increases, the optimal contract is chosen to induce stronger complementarities so as to increase the probability of full success.
Notice that the payment for full success and the likelihood of receiving it both increase with Q. Thus, when the productive relationship is more valuable, the agent has a higher chance of earning very large compensation.
IV. Empirical Work on Executive Compensation
The empirical and anecdotal literature on executive compensation is enormous and contentious. Nevertheless, there appears to be general agreement on the basic facts of executive (mostly CEO) compensation. In subsection A we describe these facts and assess the extent to which our model agrees or conflicts with them. In subsection B we use our model to offer some ideas about which data and measurement methods are most relevant and about the interpretation of some empirical findings in the literature.
A. The Data
Our data are taken from Standard and Poor's Execucomp database, a widely used source of information on CEO pay. We have (after some exclusions for incomplete data) 6,341 annual observations on CEOs of large nonagricultural firms during 1992-96. The primary components of CEO pay are salary, bonuses, and stock options. Chief executive officers do receive other compensation, such as awards of restricted stock, payouts from long-term incentive plans, and other "miscellaneous" payments, but for simplicity we ignore them.
The interpretation of the salary and options figures is straightforward. Salary is a payment the CEO receives while remaining CEO and averages roughly $500,000 annually. The options figures refer to an option's Black-Scholes value at the date on which the option was awarded and so represent the expected value of what the CEO might get out of post-award date variation in the firm's performance, not the realized value.
12 (There are some data on realizations, which we discuss below.) Options are zero for about one-third of the observations, with a median value of about $250,000 and averaging just under $900,000.
The expected value of options awarded, while large, is not too different from the typical salary. This is not surprising from the standpoint of the theory since, as stated in proposition 5, the realized reward for full success, should be large relative to pay for any other outcome. * f , But the expected value of this reward,
should not be * * * t(c )[1 Ϫ t(c )]f , so large; in fact, the expected payment for full success may be less than the payment for general failure.
The data on bonuses are harder to interpret. While the Execucomp data do not allow us to determine what the bonuses reward, data from the compensation consulting firm Towers Perrin's 1997 Annual Incentive Plan Design Survey (see Murphy 2000 , table 1) cover many of the same firms. In these data, of the 68 firms basing bonuses on a single entity, all but seven base the bonus solely on measures of current overall firm performance (earnings, earnings before interest and taxes, or operating income less a charge for capital). For the 109 firms basing bonuses on more than one object, Murphy's table does not allow us to determine the frequency with which firms reward objects other than full success. 13 But of the 307 objects on which bonuses are based, 164 are some combination of earnings, earnings before interest and taxes, or operating income less a charge for capital.
14 Bonuses that might reasonably be interpreted as payments for specific outcomes are very uncommon; the most common of these are strategic goals (eight cases) and operating objectives (12 cases). Thus the interpretation of the bonus data that is most consistent with these data is that bonuses are payments for full success over the preceding fiscal year, not payments for specific operational or strategic successes.
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12 While firms may choose any value for the exercise price of an option, they almost invariably (96 percent of the firms in Murphy [1999, table 5] ) choose an exercise price equal to the current market price. Other anecdotal evidence indicates that firms strictly prefer this value. For example, it is increasingly common for a firm to issue "replacement options" with a reduced exercise price following a large drop in the firm's stock price. Although the structure of corporate taxation provides a compelling explanation for why a firm would not grant options whose exercise price is below the current price, we know of no well-developed argument for why the exercise price should not be above the current price.
13 For example, there are eight occurrences of bonuses for completion of strategic goals, but we do not know whether this corresponds to one firm with eight goals or eight firms with one goal each.
14 The other entities that commonly generate a bonus are sales (25 cases) and customer satisfaction (12 cases). 15 The bonus data present two further issues influencing their interpretation. First, there are 1,187 data points in which observed bonuses are zero. We do not know whether the CEO had the possibility of a positive bonus but received none, or whether a bonus was not included in the pay package. Second, many bonuses might better be regarded as a The rarity of pay for specific outcomes is quite consistent with our model. For the firm to succeed, the CEO must perform many highly complementary activities, ranging from setting long-term strategic objectives to interacting with stock analysts and the media. Paying the CEO highly for success on any specific dimension would simply motivate the CEO to specialize in those activities that are most intrinsically interesting or controllable, and so forth.
Our results suggest that in environments such as those just discussed, employees should be compensated primarily on a measure of their overall success. Our results also suggest that these payments for overall success will be large but rarely realized. Thus it is interesting to consider the data on realized pay for corporate executives, particularly the data on the use of stock options as compensation. Although the average Black-Scholes value of granted options has the same order of magnitude as the average salary, the data on the value of options actually exercised, or exercisable, indicate that in many cases options generate no payment at all and that in a small number of cases options yield considerable wealth. Table 1 contains the quartiles of the 1992 and 1996 (the earliest and latest in our data) distributions of the value of exercised and exercisable options (most options are not exercisable until they have been held for a specified "vesting" period).
The median value achieved by exercising options is zero in both 1992 and 1996, and the median values of exercisable options are $356,165 and $943,529. Even at the third quartile, exercised options are only $402, 248 and $312,889, and exercisable options $1,667,195 and $4,397,495 . To put these numbers in perspective, note that the largest category is exercisable options. Despite the fact that these options have typically been accumulated over several years, 75 percent of CEOs have exercisable options amounting to no more than 10 times the median CEO's annual pay. However, both exercised and unexercisable options component of salary, in the sense that performance would have to be very low for the maximum possible bonus not to be awarded. Neither of these difficulties exists when options data are being interpreted. rise to two to three orders of magnitude greater than the median CEO pay in the right tails of their distributions. These data are consistent with the prediction of our model that optimal compensation will include large, but rarely realized, pay possibilities.
Two other familiar points about CEO compensation can be obtained from table 2, which contains regression coefficients from reduced-form regressions in which the dependent variable is the proportion of salary, bonuses, or options in total compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and options), and the independent variables are firm size, measured by billions of dollars of sales; industry, based on standard industrial classification groupings, with transportation and public utilities being the base; and year dummies.
The first fact is that for larger firms, salary makes up a smaller proportion of compensation, and correspondingly, pay based on full success, including bonuses and options, makes up a greater proportion. When other things are assumed equal, larger firms have greater opportunities for value creation (higher Q in our model), so this fact is consistent with proposition 7.
Second, relative to the transportation and public utilities industry, in other industries, salary uniformly makes up a smaller proportion of pay and options a greater proportion. The point estimates of the industry coefficients in the equation in which the bonus proportion is the dependent variable are not all positive, but all the significant coefficients are positive. Thus bonuses also make up a greater proportion outside the transportation and public utilities industries. A common interpre-tation of results of this sort is that regulation of the transportation and public utilities industries leaves firms with fewer or smaller opportunities to create value (see, e.g., Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993) . In the language of our model, firms in these industries have smaller values of Q. Thus the model predicts that incentive pay in these industries provides smaller rewards for general firm success.
B. Implications for Further Empirical Research
A number of papers in the literature analyze the components and sensitivity of CEO pay and consider the relation between pay and firm characteristics; however, our model suggests measures of pay, pay sensitivity, and firm size that are different from those commonly used.
For example, the data used by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Murphy (1986) , and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) do not contain information on stock options, which our model (and the data discussed in the previous subsection) suggests are an important component of pay. In other work, Murphy (1985 Murphy ( , 1992 and Jensen and Murphy (1990) value stock options (using Black-Scholes) on the date issued to the CEO and do not consider gains to the CEO from exercising the options. But, on the basis of our model, the relevant feature of CEO pay is the whole distribution of CEO compensation, not simply the expected value of the options at the time they are issued; indeed, the incentive implied by two options packages with equal expected value, but one having more options and a higher exercise price, are very different.
When one is considering the relation between pay and firm size, our model suggests that a measure of firm size should be used that captures the potential value increase from full success (Q in our model).
16 Thus one might consider using measures of the potential abnormal return of a firm or measures of the size of the growth opportunities available to the firm. For example, a firm's market-to-book ratio can serve as a measure of the growth options available to a firm. The model suggests that this type of measure of firm potential should be positively related to average CEO pay (consistent with the results of Smith and Watts [1992] and Gaver and Gaver [1993] ) and to the sensitivity of CEO pay.
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To measure the sensitivity of pay, our model suggests that one should consider the differences in CEO pay that occur under different hypo- 16 Note that firm size effects are not directly captured in our model. That is, our model implies that, conditional on firm size (as measured by, say, sales or market capitalization), firms with a higher potential increase in value have higher CEO pay and more sensitive CEO pay. 17 In fact, to the extent that firms with large market capitalization tend to be those with stable cash flows and with value that is mainly due to assets in place, we would expect firms with large market capitalization to have low growth potential (low Q) and thus low CEO pay and low sensitivity of CEO pay. thetical levels of success. If one pay package has a larger change in pay for any given change in the level of success, then it should be considered more sensitive. Finally, our model suggests that components of pay with different incentive properties should be considered separately. In particular, payments for overall success, whether bonuses or options, should be considered together, and bonuses for outcomes other than full success should be considered separately. In addition, because of the way options and bonuses are typically measured in the empirical literature, their incentive properties also differ because the options are measured when granted (before the performance they are meant to reward) and bonuses are measured when they are realized (after the performance for which they are a reward).
V. Discussion
This section contains a discussion of related research and a number of robustness issues.
A. Related Research
Our model is most similar to the models in Milgrom (1991, 1994) .
18 As in our paper, they consider an agent's effort choice over multiple tasks. In a simplified version of their model, there are two tasks, and output on task i is given by where t i is chosen by x p t ϩ e , The incentive contract considered offers the agent a payment of 0.
where and To contrast these papers with b ϩ a x ϩ a x , a 1 0 a 1 0.
1 1 2 2 1 2 ours, note that the incentive contracts we allow have the more general form In our model, in which the tasks are b ϩ a x ϩ a x ϩ a x x . 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 substitute uses of the agent's time but complements from the principal's perspective, the principal optimally selects a 3 large and b, a 1 , and a 2 much smaller. Also, in our model it is typically the case that and a ! 0 1 and this always holds when there is potential for large output. a ! 0, 2 18 Another related model is that of Grossman and Hart (1983) . Our model differs from theirs in several respects, the most important of which is that in our model, the agent's unobserved actions influence the probability distribution over success on two activities, and the realized success or failure on these activities is observed by the principal and determines the final payoff received by the principal. Thus, in our model, compensation may be based on the observed level of success on the intermediate activities. In Grossman and Hart, the general probability distribution of final output may be interpreted as being generated by the agent's success on intermediate activities, but these activities are not observed and so cannot form the basis for compensation. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) show that when efforts on the different tasks are substitutes, it is important that incentives be balanced. This leads to the conclusion that if one task is hard to measure, then it can be optimal to offer flat incentives, which is never optimal in our model. Holmström and Milgrom (1994) assume that the different tasks are imperfect substitutes from the agent's perspective and consider the case in which the principal's benefit function B is additively separable in the tasks, so there are no complementarities between tasks from the principal's perspective. They show that the optimal incentive intensities on the tasks, a 1 and a 2 , are complements in the sense that parameter changes increasing a 1 also increase a 2 ; they also derive various crosssectional empirical implications. Although the reason for the complementarity in the incentive intensities is related to the problem of adverse specialization, the results in our model differ because of the more general contract form considered.
Our work is similar in spirit to, but different in approach from, the literature on subjective performance measures, for example, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) , which focuses on compensation that includes a subjective component. Our work is different in that we are interested in purely objective performance measures. However, as in the literature on subjective compensation, we are concerned with reducing the ability of agents to "game" the compensation scheme. Baker (1992) also studies the problem of an agent's gaming the incentive contract. His work is related to ours in several ways. Baker examines the optimal linear incentive contract in a general principal-agent environment in which it is not feasible to contract directly on the principal's objective and in which the agent has private information about how his actions affect outcomes. Baker's main point is that if the agent cannot be compensated on the basis of the benefit received by the principal, then the standard solution of making the agent the residual claimant is rendered infeasible. Thus one can have a nontrivial agency problem and equilibrium inefficiency even in the absence of risk aversion. In our model, compensation for full success is, in effect, compensation based on the benefit received by the principal. We show that even if the principal can observe whether the agent achieves partial success, the principal will generally choose not to compensate the agent for partial success relative to no success. Although the observation of partial success provides the principal with information about the agent's effort choice, it is costly to reward the agent for partial success because doing so increases the agent's incentive to specialize.
B. Robustness
We now consider several directions in which our model might be extended or modified and discuss whether and how these changes affect the main results.
Equally Costly Activities
If the two activities are equally costly to the agent, that is, there is really just one type of agent, then a complementarity result continues to hold.
Proposition 8 
Proposition 8 shows that in order to give the agent a strict preference for splitting his time across the two tasks, the contract must cause t and to be strict strategic complements. In this case, since the tasks are t equally costly to the agent, he splits his time equally. At least weak complementarities are required for the probability of success to be positive.
When the two activities are equally costly, optimal p is always greater than n. Thus it is the need to prevent adverse specialization that drives the optimality of nonmonotonic contracts. When the tasks are equally costly to the agent, the agent has no cost-based incentive to specialize in one task over the other, so nonmonotonicity does not arise.
Observable Types
If the principal can observe the type of an agent, then she may prefer to offer differential payments for partial success, depending on which activity is successful. In this case, a weaker version of the complementarities result holds, and although the problem is more complicated, we expect that a version of the nonmonotonicity result continues to hold.
When the principal offers payment p for success on the agent's lowcost activity and for success on the agent's high-cost activity, the agent's p expected payoff is
If we let and so forth,
from which it is immediate that Thus t and
are strategic complements if and only if the utility increment from t success on both activities instead of just his low-cost activity is at least as great as the utility increment from success on his high-cost activity instead of success on none.
Proposition 9. The agent strictly prefers time allocation sat-(t, t ) isfying only if and in which
Proposition 9 is analogous to our results when and shows that p p p in order for output to be positive, the contract must cause t and to t be strategic complements from the perspective of the agent.
Note that the conditions of proposition 9 require that u( f ) Ϫ and In addition, in or-
as is efficient, it must be that
These constraints give us lower bounds on f, and n, but no lower p , bound on p. Thus, as before, p is bounded only by concerns of mitigating risk and meeting the individual rationality constraint and will generally be less than n.
More General Contracts
In previous sections, we assume that the principal offers one contract to both types of agent and that there is one payment p for partial success regardless of the activity on which the success occurs. There are other alternatives.
19 First, can the principal benefit from offering a single contract that has different payments for the two types of partial success? We can show that the principal cannot benefit from offering this type of contract if the agents are risk neutral and Q is sufficiently large. And, even when the agents are risk averse or Q is not large, there exist conditions under which the principal cannot benefit from offering this type of contract. Loosely, by rewarding success on one activity more than success on the other, the principal is partially tailoring the contract to one type, which could pay if one type is much more likely, or if it is optimal to allow the agent a large degree of specialization, as might occur when Q is low.
Can the principal benefit by offering a menu of contracts, that is, inducing self-selection and tailoring the contract to the revealed agent type by offering different payments for different kinds of partial success? We can show that the principal can never benefit from offering such a menu of contracts. The argument is simply that the agent will always select the contract that compensates his low-cost activity more and then specialize (possibly completely).
Altogether, the principal cannot benefit from offering menus of contracts and can benefit only from offering contracts with different payments for the two types of partial success in unusual circumstances. That is, the principal cannot readily improve on the optimal contract we identify in the previous sections. These results do not require that the probability that the agent is of either type is exactly one-half. Thus we can also relax this assumption to some degree.
Limited Liability
The optimal contract in our model may require a payment from the agent to the principal in some cases. In particular, may be negative * p and require large payments from the agent to the principal in the case of partial success. For some applications, the scale of payments involved may be so large that it is implausible that the agent could deliver such large sums to the firm. For example, in the context of a large corporation, success on multiple dimensions may mean innovative product development and complementary marketing efforts. The financial consequences of management's failure to succeed on either dimension may well amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, or even billions, in the case of the largest corporations. 20 If we impose the constraint that all contract terms be nonnegative, our results continue to hold, but with the obvious adjustment for the possibility that the lower bound on * p could bind.
Sabotage
Thus far, we have assumed that the principal can observe the success or failure of activities assigned to the agent. Under this assumption, the principal will often find it advantageous to create complementarities among tasks by compensating partial success even less than complete failure. Our assumption is descriptive in many instances. For example, a CEO may be charged with developing new products and rejuvenating a marketing organization. These activities go on simultaneously and in the open, so it is not difficult for the firm's board of directors to determine the extent of success on either activity. But in other instances, it is more plausible that the agent could prevent the principal from discovering partial success or arrange complete failure if partial success appears imminent.
The optimal contract in our model will typically have But if * * p ! n . 20 Indeed, the fact that the risks are so large is the basis for Haubrich's (1994) demonstration that trivial risk aversion leads, in a standard agency setting, to optimal CEO pay sensitivity that is very low and similar to the sensitivities documented by Jensen and Murphy (1990). it is possible for the agent to sabotage the outcome of one of the activities, then such a contract may not be optimal. When concerns of sabotage have an effect on the contract, the effect is to decrease n and increase p so that incentives for sabotage in the case of partial success are reduced or eliminated. In the extreme, if sabotage is costless for the agent, then the optimal contract must have
The basic fea- * * n ≤ p . tures of pay in the model are preserved, including the need for complementarities, and especially the result that the distribution of pay is right-skewed, with a large, but rarely earned, payment for full success.
VI. Conclusion
The paper formalizes and studies a common situation: As a result of complementarities among activities, the division of labor is incomplete, leaving individuals with multiple-task jobs in which they see the tasks as alternative uses of work time and, thus, substitutes. When the firm cannot monitor employee behavior closely, or does not find it economic to do so, and has imperfect information about how costly employees find the various tasks, realizing the complementarities among tasks requires well-chosen incentives. The firm must construct a compensation contract transforming activities that are substitutable as far as the employee is concerned into ones the employee finds highly complementary, so that the employee will choose a time allocation more to the liking of the firm. We show that optimal compensation rewards success on multiple activities highly and rewards any other outcome much less. Because simultaneous success on multiple activities is achieved comparatively rarely, the implied distribution of pay is highly right-skewed. Also, since motivating the employee to divide time among a number of tasks makes more likely the possibility of failure on all dimensions, optimal pay typically compensates general failure at least as much as partial success, resulting in an optimal contract that is nonmonotone. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Since we assume that it is optimal for the principal to induce the agent to work, first, and, second, * * * * * * *
V(t(c
Then the second inequality implies that and so * * * * f ≤ n . n 1 p , which contradicts the first inequal- * * * * * V(0, 0, c ) p u(n ) 1 V(t(c ), 1 Ϫ t(c ), c ), ity. Thus Suppose Then which contradicts the sec- * * * * * * * f 1 n . f ≤ p . p ≥ f 1 n , ond inequality. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
Since we assume that it is optimal for the principal to induce the agent to work, and * * * * * * t(c )[1 Ϫ t(c )] (0, 1) V(t(c ), 1 Ϫ t(c ), c ) ≥ max {u, u(n )}. Case 1.
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